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Should economists still believe that their j urnal articles remain unread and eVen if read, politely ignored, our recent experience should quickly disabuse them. The THR has already published five comments on our paper 1 and prepublished copies of at least two of the comments (by Joseph Pechman and Ira ShaAcansky) have made their way to and through Washingt n officialdom, the higher education e tablishment, and our own university administration. These developments suggest that our results may have hit a more se --tive nerve than we had suspected, by calling into question an important part of the folklore about higher education's role in inc redistribution.
Pechman and Sharkansky, to whose comments this reply is dire-ted, focus the bulk of their attention on our treatnent of the income distributional effects of public higher education. We are pleased to see this emphaLs;ia on distributional considerations, for there has been too little work at either the conceptual or empirical level on the distribution of benefits from public expenditure programs.
Hence thEre is need to examine alternative approaches programs. 2 for analyzing the distributive effects of public Our approach, as part of a book dealing with the size and distribution -f benefits and costs of one public service, higher educaticn, involved comparing the distributional pattern of subsidies for higher education in California with the distr bution of state and local taxes.
Specifically, we showed for different classes of families--those no children in public higher education and those with children in each of California's three public sys em of higher education--the eve _g= family income and the higher education subsidy received. To highlight the magnitude of th subsidies, we also presented data on all state and local taxes paid, bas d on the average income of each these diffe-ent populati n groups. Finally, we indicated that the pattern of net transfers (subsidies received less average state and local taxes paid) is least favorable to junior-college studerts, who come from families with lower average income, and is _ost favorable to University of California students, who come from higher average-income families.
We must underscore here again what we -ere careful to emphasize earlier (article, p. 189, and book, p. 77)--that the final work as to the redistr butional effects of all government programs cannot be written on the basis a study of any one public service. A broader analysis is needed of the distribution of the ben fits from the full range of government programs, since some state and local services benefit the le s affluent and the noncollege-going population, while others benefit the weal-hy and the collegegoing. 'In the absence of complete information on all programs, however, and
given the frequent claims that public higher education is a major p ogram for income redistribution, it seemed worthwhile to undertake this limited analysis.
Tax Allocation
A major objection of Pechman and Sharkansky centers on our _reatment of the distribution of the burden of taxes that suppo t higher education.
Sharkansky claims that what is relevant is not the distribution of actual state and local tax payments, but rather the d stribution of tax payments reweighted_ to reflect the reiative mix of state versus local expenditures on ublic hi.g.hp_r_eclaclgflall. His position is that "since" public higher education in California is financed piimarily--71 percent-by the somewhat progressive state tax system, and only 29 percent by. the regressive local tax system, the net redistributive effect is "substantially different" from our estimates (Sharkansky, p. 235 Our conclusion is r inforced: among college students, those eligible and able to attend only the Junior Colleges receive the smallest net transfers, and on average they come from lower income fa ilies than those whose children are enrolled in either of the other two public systems. And students in the State Colleges receive smaller net transfers and on average come from lower income families than those enrolled in the University of Calif-nia.
More important, though, Sharkansky's weighting approach for determining who pays the taxes is questionable. Either one compares the distribution -f higher education subsidies with all state and local taxes, as we attempted to do, or one compares the subsidies with only those state and local taxes used "to support public higher education." Sharkansky apparently prefers the latter, although he neither says so explicitly nor do his calculations clarify his intentions. Such an approach requires making two highly arbitrary assumptions about,the taxes paid at each income level for a particular public expenditre such as higher education. Specifically, his approach assumes implicitly that f expenditures on public higher educetion were changed, then state and local taxes would be altered in the 71-29 6 percent propo and (2) if public expenditures on higher education were changed, then there would be an equi-proportional change in state taxes at each income level, and an equi-proportional (but not necessarily the same) £ane in local taxes at each income level. 4
Unless these assumptions are made, it does not follow that simply because the state tax system as a whole is more progressive, that state support for public higher education is financed more progressively.
Pechman's criticism.involves the same assumptions about taxes; -but he too is apparently unaware of the arbitrariness of these assumptions when he argues that we should have considered only those state and local taxes which are paid to support public higher education.
He goes onto identify not only which taxes but which taxpayers--according to income group--pay for public higher edutation. He doed this by assuming implicitly that all taxpayers at every income level pay the same percentage of their total state and local tax payments for higher education. 5 While such an allocation --y seem reasonable at first blush, this di tributional assumption is actually completely arbit-Y;
tho can say how much of which income class's tax dollars pay for any particular public service?
It is possible to give meaning to the question of whose tax payments finance a particular public expenditure, but not by the method used by
Pechman. We suggest that the particular expenditure, and the taxes to finance it, must be viewed in a marginal, not an average fashion. One should ask:
if public expenditures on higher education in California were reduced (increased) hy a specified amount, ceteris paribus, which taxes and whose tax payments would be reduced (increased)? We do not know the answer.
There is little likelihood, however, that there would occur an equi-proportional 9 decrease in every individual type of tax paid by per o s at each income level.
Yet this is precisely the assumption that is implicit in the taxallo ation app oach adopted by Pechman! (Mo cover, the question might be answered quite differently if increased rather than decreased expenditures were under consideration.)
We do not deny either the desirability or the possibility of determining who pays the marginal taxes.
Rather we wish to emphasize that researchers cannot simply assume, without oftering some kind of justification, that the distribution of _arginal taxes (marginal in the sense that they would be unnecessary if a par=icular program were cut back or eliminated) is the same as the distribution of taxes currently -paid.-
We believe that a comparison of benefits received :ith taxes paid in the marsinal sense is the preferred approach. Finding it difficult to make the marginal allocations, however, we preferred a second-best approach --comparing benefits with total taxes paid for all state-and-local services.
We thus avoided making arb trary decisions as to which group _f taxpayers paid those taxes that financed higher education. At the same time our results showed the relative magnitudes of the individual benefits subsidies) from public higher education, by comparing benefits with a tax-payment magnitude; for the latter we chose total state and local taxes paid by individual taxpayers during the years that their children were in college.
Some other basis for comparison might have been used, and in that sense Our approach is arbitrary. M _e important, however, our approach, in contrast with that involving the "arbitrary allocation of taxes, is less likely to be misleading. The point is that a comparison -f benefits from higher education with the taxes paid "for higher education" may lead readers to a quick judgment Tegarding the "equity" of the balance, whereas a comparison of higher-education benefits with taxes paid for all state and local programs has weaker no mative connotations, since readers recognize, quite properly, that the benefits from other programs may be distributed quite differently.
In short, given the absence of estima =es of the marginal distribution of tax burdens, to finance any particular public program, it is best to concentrate attention simply on the distribution of benefits. If a comparison with taxes is desired, we suggest some magnitude which does not require a determination of whose tax dollars finance the particular program.
ClassifylnkBeneficiaries
We turn next to the question of how people should be classified for the purpose of analyzing the di tribution of subsidies and taxes paid. While
Pechman appears to say that the e is only one correct way, we believe that there may be several different useful ways. We see merit in examining the distribution of benefits and burdens for people classified by income level, as does Pechman. However, -e also believe that it is useful to classify people by level of benefi s received (type of higher education system attended), as we have done. Our reasons are as follows. While all high school graduates in California are eligible to attend Junior College (JC only-the top three-eights are eligible to attend a State College (SC), and an even smaller group--the top one-eighth-s eligible to attend the Univers ty _f California (UC). As we have pointed out, the subsidy level is lowest at the JC's and highest at the UC's. Again, as we have shown, the de facto eligibilitywhich is a product of achievement in high school together with financial cons aints--leads to an overrep on of high-income students in high-ubsidy (UC) schools and conversely for lower-subsidy (JC) schools.
The point to be emphasized is that the system of eligibility and subsidies --a system that is, after all, an instru-ent of policy--determines which students (in t-ms of family income level) will in fact receive the various subsidies. Consequently, it is useful for the purpose of policy formulation to know, as we shOwed, that on average the largest higher-education subsidies are going to those state-supported universities where high-income students are most highly represented.
Although we are eclectic in our view of how to look at the distribution of benefits and burdens, we do not favor Pechman's approach. As we pointed out earlier, his approach involves arbitrary assumptions about the amounts of taxes paid at each level of income to support a p -ticular public expenditure program.
In addition, his approach, py failing te distinguish between those persons who receive benefits and those who receive none, hides the substantial and unequal variance in benefits within income classes. This is not an objection to examining the distribution of benefits and burdens by income class, but rather is an objection to Pechman's approach. What he has done is to average the subste ial benefits received by a small number of persons who receive benefits with the zero-benefits received by the vastly larger number of persons at each income level. This procedure also cloaks the fact that among families with children of college age, the proportion that benefit from public higher education is much lower at the bOttoli end of the income dist_bution than at the top end. If Pechman had looked at benefits and burdens for only those people receiving benefits, the picture 12 portrayed would have been quite different. While the tax burden per beneficiary would haVe been unchanged, the benefit per beneficiary would have been many t_es greater than the average benefit for every unit in the indome distribution, since most Of the units gain no benefits whatsoever.
Benefits would be far in excess of tax burdens (as Pechman Even yere we to concede the applicability of Pechman's arbitrary procedure for determining the income distribution of taxes to a specific public expenditure program, what does he find? Ile reports that the California system provides subsidies that approximately equal taxes paid "for high r education" ii each income class except those over $20,000 per year (Pechman, Table 3 ).
For a public program that is so frequently justified on grounds of its effects on equality of opportunity and hence on the income distribution, this is scarcely testimony for its success.
There is precious little redistribution going on here.
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More important why should one be pleased with a balance between the taxes paid for higher education (even if that concept were meaningful) and the subsidies received withIn each income size class? Is the public highereducation system working "sati'sfactorily" from an equity viewpoint when most low-income persons without children receive no higher-education 13 subsidies but pay taxes "for higher education," while many high-income persons with children in the California colleges and universities receive large subsidies?' Admittedly, a one-year comparison of subsidies and taxes is not -dequate, because families do not have children in college continuously. Ideally,, a lifetime analysis would be made, unfortunately though, Pechman's approach does not handle this problem any more satisfactorily than we.did.
Pechman and Sharkansky also fAWt our tax-burden estimates because of our exclusion of state _orporte income taxes. Estimation of the incidence of this tax is-a major undertaking which even the State of California, th its large program of tax research, had not performed. Moreover, it is entirely too simple to assume uncritically--as Pechman does--that the incidence of the corporate income tax is progressive. The ownership of corporate equi y certainly increases with income; but it ia a large leap from this observation to a conclusion about the income-class incidence of the tax. Pechman hemself wrote in hik recent book that "...there is probably less agreement about who really pays the corporate income tax than there is about any other tax." Although he was referring to the federal tax, the bulk of his discussion also applies to a state tax. Even to the extent that the tax is borne by corporate shareholders, and not shifted, there is a presumption that the tax has been capitalized into equity prides.
Thus, current_ shareholders are not likely to bear much of the tax even if corporations have been unable to shift it.
Other Issues
We turn now to several other criticisms made by Sharkansky and Pechman.
To begin with, we do share PechmA's view that even more signific than the pattern of subsidies is the effect of the subsidies on the lifetime distribution of income. Of course, no one knows whether the rate o return on higher education varies systematically by income class of student, or if it does, what the differences, or even the direction of differences, are. Until evidence-is obtained, however, we see no justification for assuming, as Pechman seems to suggest, that the income distribution of subsidies is either uncorrelated or negatively correlated with subsequent changes in thelifetime distribution of earnings. Moreover, if the price elasticity of college-going is greater (absolutely)
for lower income students--as seems probable--then a shifting of subsidies from the nonneedy to the needy would tend to narrow the distribution of lifetime income unless rates of return on higher education are correlated in a Atrongly negative manner with paren al income.
Sharkansky faulted us for the treatment in our book of the distribution of benefits as between residents and nonresidents of California. He asserts that just as we excluded the taxes paid by emigrants when we estimated the benefits to California taxpayers from the State's investment in public undergraduate education, so we should have included_ the taxes paid by college educated inmigrants to California.
Su h symmetry may seem reasonable, but it would be incorrect. As we explained (book, pp. 38-40) , it would be proper to consider inmigration as producing a "benefit" from California public higher education if, but only if, the immigration occurs because of the existence of the California system of _public undergraduate education. Perhaps later research will shed light on the elasticity of migra ion with respect to expenditures on public higher education in the state, but Sharkansky offers no evidence and gives no indication of even recognizing the issue, judgmentand it remains only a judgment--is that the elasticity is close to zero, at least over a the "relevant range" of plausible.variation in public support levels. Moreover, if one were to accept Sharkansky's argument and count tax payments (less public service costs), we presume accompanying immigration, this ould imply that all i Jgration of noncollege-educated people and the . taxes they pay would be attributed to the state's &Inc higher education. This is obviously untenable.
Sharkansky's mistreatmentoI the alleged externalities from migration has its counterpart in Pechmen's comments about external benefits. Pechman fails to distinguish between external benefits from public higher education and from higher education in general. The nature and magaitude of external benefits of higher education at -he undergraduate level continue-to be an important and unresolved issue. Pechman admits that "it is probably impossible to measure the value of the public benefits" (p. 369); yet he defends the current practice of charging low tuition for all students at public universities by arguing implicitly that the external benefits are large enough to jus 'fy the present levels -f subsidies to even the high income students.
His logic is faulty. tven if the external benefits of higher education are "latge"--and we are dubiousthis is not relevant tothe allocativeefficiency question. If public subsidies to the wealthy were diminished, would many of the wealthy students forego college? Or, insofar as some might shift to private colleges, is there any reason to believe that the external benefits froM priyAte higher education are any less than those from L2IL__Ais higher education? Finally, for those financially able students who would decide not to go to college at all without the public subsidypresumably because they are not very serious about college, might we not guess that the loss of external benefits would be small,. zero, or even negative?
The fact is that even if the external benefits of higher education are high, Pechman has offer d absolutely no reason for believing that they are greater for public than for private colleges; thus, since a cut In public subsidies tn.11ADIsliAtIt families would probably result in little rliminution in their rate of college attendance, such a cut would produce little or no loss in external benefits. What counts for allocative eff' ciency is not the external benefits per dollar of subsidy to each financially able public university student, but the EIL.r.g.11 external benefits with respect to the level of public subsidy. Only to the extent that a decrease in such subsidies would cause well-to-do students to forego college altogether--not merely to shift from public to private schools--would there be any change in the external benefits of higher education, however large or small, positive or negative, those benefits are: We have dealt with some of these issues in our forthcoming paper, "Distributional Effects of Tax and Expenditure Programs: A Framework for Analysis."
3Both Pechman and Sharkansky object to our use of family income data for parent-supported students rather than for all students. We regret that we did not make clear why we made such a choice, but it was made on solid grounds. Our objective was to indicate the incomes of the parent families from which college students are drawn, in order to highlight the income selectivity that operates in affecting college attendance and, hence, the amount of subsidy received.
While income data for parent-supported children are quite clear in representing parental family income, the "family" income data for pelf-supported students are not so clear. A careful reading of the questionnaire in'the Appendix to the Sanders-Palmer study (Edward Sanders and Hans Palmer, The Financial Barriers to Hher Education in California, Pomona College, 1965) reveals that students over age 21 who did not list their parents on college record forms were instructed to forward the questionnaires to their parents, or if that did not seem appropriate, to report their own "family" income.
Based on our inspection of the data, we concluded that most of the self-supported students reported their own income rather than their parent's income.
First, we noted that the average family size of self-supported students is considerably smaller than that for parent-supported students; this indicates that self-supported students had established their own households. Second, self-supported students are older and thus more likely to be independent of their parents, and hence are more likely to be reporting their own (lower) incomes than the income of parents. Third, the percentage of self-supported and also part-time students was greatest at the JC's and lowest at UC; hence we are picking up the much larger proportion of older students at the JC's who are continuing parttime college study while working and maintaining a family of their own. For all these reasons we concluded that the incomes of the parent-supported students gave a better representation of the parental incomes of all students than would be obtained by blending the quite differently reported incomes of the two groups of students. 1970).
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